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The Kenyan banking sector has experienced a myriad of changes, both negative and 
positive. Being a developing economy, the sector’s efficiency and sustenance is vital to the 
country’s economy. Enterprise Risk Management and Board of Directors’ composition are 
both significant issues ensuring stable economies and avoiding corporate mishaps such as 
those witnessed in the Eron and Worldcom cases. ERM is measured in terms of financ ia l 
performance. It is in this light that this study seeks to find the relationship between ERM 
and board composition in terms of gender, education, and board size. Based on the 
Shannon’s diversity test, the study establishes that the boards of Kenyan listed banks are 
not diversified in terms of gender and educational backgrounds in boards is quite minimal. 
The study also finds out that there exists a relationship between board composition and 
ERM.  
 








1.1 Background to the study 
After the 2008 global financial crisis, a paradigm shift has had to happen in the way 
financial and non-financial institutions view risk management. Instead of looking at risk 
management from an individual-based perspective of various risks, a holistic view of risk 
management is being adopted. This is enterprise risk management (ERM) ( Berger, Kick , 
& Schaeck, 2012). Unlike traditional risk management where individual risk categories are 
separately managed in risk "silos", ERM enables firms to manage a wide array of risks in 
an integrated, wholistic manner (Liebenber & Hoyt , 2011). An increasing number of 
organizations globally have implemented or are considering adopting ERM programs. It is 
in this new dawn that ERM and board of directors’ relationship has also blossomed with 
organizations such as Ernest & Young (EY) (2015) referring to ERM implementation as 
the top priority function and trend for board of directors.  
This turbulence impacted the core existence of the banking industry with major regulatory 
reforms being adopted with the aim of enhancing stability and transparency. The Kenyan 
banking sector has not been of exception where it has seen the Central Bank of Kenya 
(CBK) put three banks under receivership due to challenges associated with liquidity and 
mismanagement, among others (Stevies, 2016).  
Mínguez-Vera, Campbell, & Antonio (2008) and Berger, Kick , & Schaeck (2012) find 
that high-profile financial crisis and failures of organizations such as Enron and 
WorldCom, and subsequent corporate governance reforms have contributed to the 
increased attention on the role of board of directors in recent years in search of how to 
improve and reform governance arrangements and risk management. Corporate 
governance research has devoted tremendous effort to studying the roles of the board of 
directors in recent years, with the composition of the board of directors raising particular 
interest ( Berger, Kick , & Schaeck, 2012). Reports, such as the Turnbull 1999 Report on 
Internal Control issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
(ICAEW) for the board of directors of UK listed companies ( McCrae & Balthazor, 2000), 
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have provided guidelines which incorporate directors' and managers' responsibilities into 
the areas of corporate risk management and makes the board of directors specifica lly 
accountable for developing organization-wide risk management policies and for 
implementing integrated, inclusive and dynamic risk management strategies (Financ ia l 
Reporting Council, 2011).  
Diversity indices such as the Simpson Index (D), the Jaccardʼs index, and Smith and 
Wilson’s Index (Magurran, 2003), provide information about community composition. 
Gender quotas are often seen being advocated for to help improve career outcomes for 
females and ‘break the glass ceiling’, and the same goes for educational requirements for 
boards to improve corporate governance. 
1.2 Problem statement 
The banking sector and its stability is a key strategic asset for any developing economy, in 
Kenya particularly, as it is a direct measure of availability of finance and financial services  
(Muteti, 2014). With this vital role that the banking industry plays, comes high risks in its 
operations and sustainability. These are increased by technological advancements, high 
competition, and globalization, leading to increased complexity of the banks’ risk profile 
(Dafikpaku, 2011). This then puts management as a key competence component and board 
of directors in the perspective of this study. Board members play a vital role during mergers 
and acquisitions, assessing the overall direction and strategy of any business which 
includes risk management, hence serves as the backbone of the company given (Kilic, 
2015).  
The recent financial crisis and the failure of banking system even in the developed 
countries like the USA has forced the policy makers and researchers to look into the details 
of these failures and in doing so, enterprise-wide risk management and board of directors’ 
composition have both emerged as trends that are pivotal to the survival of any organiza t ion 
( Yegon, Mouni, & Wanjau, 2014). Waves of change such as increased female 
appointments and participation in the BOD as a regulatory requirement such as that 
provided for in the Kenyan constitution, has raised stereotypes and uninfo rmed 
conclusions. This study aims at giving empirical and reliable conclusion on the BOD size, 
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gender representation and education background in the banking industry in the context of 
ERM implementation.  
1.3 Research objectives 
The broad objective of this study is to deduce the relationship between Board of Directors 
composition and ERM implementation in the Kenyan listed banks. The specific objectives 
are:  
1. To measure the level of diversity in the BOD of listed banks in Kenya.  
2. To determine whether there is a relationship between diversity of BOD and ERM 
implementation.  
 
1.4  Research hypothesis 
The research hypothesis in this study is: 
H01: Boards in Kenya’s listed banks are diversified. 
H02: There is a correlation between board composition and ERM in Kenyan banks. 
 
1.5  Scope of research 
The proposed research will focus on publicly trading banks in Kenya due to the ease of 
accessing the data required. The study will seek to determine how board of directors’ size, 
gender and education background interweave with ERM implementation. The period under 
consideration will be between 2008 and 2015 for the 10 banks listed on the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange (NSE). This is because this is the immediate period during and after 
the financial crisis during which major reforms in corporate governance and risk 
management took place. 
1.6  Significance 
The study provides useful information to policy makers and regulators such as the CBK to 
formulate and enhance policies and programs that will actively stimulate the growth and 
sustainability of the banking industry in the country and in the process, alleviate issues 
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such as those seen in Imperial Bank and Chase Bank.  The study will also benefit 
management and shareholders of banks to gain insight on ERM which is a field whose 
benefits outweighs its costs. It will help companies as their make their board appointments  
and other upcoming boards as that very important composition is made, and particularly in 
a volatile economy like that of many African countries, for sustenance and success of these 
business today. Both ERM and board diversity are emerging issues of research. This study 
will make contribution to this literature which is limited, to researchers and scholars and in 
Kenya especially, and in addition it hopes to spike interest in them for further studies in 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1  Evolution of risk management 
The perception that the future rests on more than just a quirk of the gods is a 
groundbreaking discovery that separated the present-day risk assessment and hedging 
techniques from decisions guided by superstition, blind faith and instinct (Bernstein, 1996). 
Risk management is an age-old discipline that can be traced way back to the Babylonian 
times (McNeil, Frey, & Embrechts, 2005) and it has grown over time in conjunction with 
other disciplines.  
Before the 1970s, corporations used to manage only the downside of risk largely by buying 
insurance against the various losses associated with accidents (Misiura, 2015). The use of 
derivatives as an instrument of risk management arose during the 1970s when financ ia l 
risk became a vital source of uncertainty in the economy (Jorion, 2010). This expanded 
rapidly during 1980s where companies intensified their financial risk management and 
tools for handling financial risk were developed. The table adopted below is an analysis of 
some of the various tools that have marked the foundation of modern risk management 
over time (Jorion, 2010). 
Table 1: Adopted from Jorion Philippe's 2010. 
Year Tool 
1938 Macaulay’s bond duration 
1952 Markowitz’s mean-variance framework 
1963 Sharpe’s one factor beta model 
1966 Multiple- factor models 
1973 Black Scholes option pricing model 
1982 ARCH models 
1992 Heath-Jarrow-Morton term structure models 
1993 Value at risk 
1994 Risk MetricsTM 
1997 CreditMetricsTM 




International regulation of risk also began in the 1980s (McNeil, Frey, & Embrechts, 2005). 
Financial institutions developed internal risk management models and governance of risk 
management became essential with the introduction of integrated risk management where 
Chief Risk Officer (CRO) positions emerged (Dickinson, 2001). Historically, companies 
formally managed risk by solely purchasing insurance policies. This has however changed 
with gradual growth of this discipline and not only is the downside of risk managed, but 
also its upside considered and exploited for example value-creating potential of risk into 
the business as a whole (Lam, 2003). Various factors have contributed to the complexity 
of the business world and the economic environment leading to the development and 
evolution of the risk management discipline and its structures. These factors include 
corporate and financial scandals, increasing market regulations and professionalism, 
globalization, innovation, information and technological developments, among others  
(Lam, 2003). 
This evolution brought about the ultimate development, ERM in the 1990s. With ERM 
came the recognition that risk affects organizations in a holistic manner unlike the 
traditional silos it was previously viewed (Lam, 2003). Increased interest and study in ERM 
over time has shifted risk management role from specific departments to the whole 
organization thus becoming one of the core strategies of responding to market changes and 
improving overall performance. The latest and growing developments have been on the 
board involvement in the governance of risk of a given organization or company by 
determining its levels of risk tolerance and risk policies, and overseeing management in 
the design, implementation and monitoring of the risk management and internal control 
systems (Corporate Governance Council, 2012; Financial Reporting Council Limited, 
2014; Financial Reporting Council, 2005).  
2.2  Enterprise risk management 
Interest in Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has continued to grow in recent years with 
an increasing number of organizations implementing or considering ERM programs such 
as universities and small businesses, consulting firms have established specialized ERM 
units, rating agencies have begun to consider ERM in the ratings process, and universit ies 
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have developed ERM-related courses and research centers (Gordon, Loeb, & Tseng., 
2009). 
Unlike traditional risk management where individual risk categories are separately 
managed in risk "silos", ERM provides a structure that combines all risk management 
activities into one integrated framework that facilitates the identification interdependenc ies 
among various risks (Lam, 2003). Management of various types of risks that an 
organization is faced with misses the most important aspects of risk management such as 
the organization’s risk appetite and management of emergent risks. Specialists and 
academicians have argued that ERM benefits firms by decreasing earnings and stock price 
volatility, reducing external capital costs, increasing capital efficiency, and creating 
synergies between different risk management activities among them being Hoyt & 
Liebenberg (2008), Kraus & Lehner (2012), and Golshan & Rasid (2012). According to 
the Society of Actuaries (SOA), organizations’ objectives for pursuing ERM are: 
competitive advantage, strategic goals, transparency of management, decision making, and 
stakeholder. 
2.2.1 The COSO Integrated ERM framework 
In the context of ERM, a framework would aid in its implementation through organizing 
and structuring an approach that can be measured and repeated (Dafikpaku, 2011). An 
ERM framework, such as the ISO 31000:2009, Risk Management – Guidelines on 
Principles and Implementation of Risk Management, ought to identify and analyze risk and 
then either avoid, reduce, share or accept it.  
In 2001, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commiss ion 
(COSO) embarked on a project, together with PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), to develop 
a readily usable framework that would evaluate and improve their organizations’ ERM  
(COSO , 2004). This was after increased spotlight on risk management that led to the 
realization that there was a need for a robust framework to effectively and efficient ly 
identify, assess, and manage risk (COSO, 2004). The Enterprise Risk Management– 
Integrated Framework was thus born in 2004 which is applicable to all industries and 
encompassing all types of risks.  
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COSO defines ERM as (COSO, 2004); “Enterprise risk management is a process, effected 
by an entity’s board of directors, management and other personnel, applied in strategy 
setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may affect the 
entity, and manage risk to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance 
regarding the achievement of entity objectives.” 
COSO’s ERM framework aligns organizational objectives and risk management 
components in a three- dimensional matrix, in form of a cube as shown below (COSO , 
2004). The vertical columns represent the four organizational objectives categories, the 
horizontal rows exhibit the components of ERM and finally the various levels of 
organizational units (COSO, 2004). This indicates that a relationship exists among the 
various aspects represented. 
Figure 1: COSO's ERM-Integrated Framework. 
 
COSO’s three- dimensional cube-matrix aligning organizational objectives and risk 
management components. 
 
2.3 The Banking sector in Kenya 
The Kenyan banking industry comprises of the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) which has 
the overall regulatory authority over this industry, commercial banks, non-bank financ ia l 
institutions, Forex bureaus and microfinance deposit institutions. As at 31 December, 2013, 
the banking sector comprised 43 commercial banks 14 of which are foreign owned, 1 
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mortgage finance company, 9 microfinance banks, 7 representative offices of foreign 
banks, 102 foreign exchange bureaus, 3 money remittance providers and 2 credit reference 
bureaus (Muteti, 2014). The dominants in the banking sector in Kenya are: Kenya 
Commercial Bank Limited, Co-operative Bank Limited, Equity Bank Limited, and 
Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Limited. The primary sources of regulation are the 
Constitution of Kenya, the Banking Act, the CBK as stated earlier, Microfinance Act, Risk 
Management Guideline, Prudential Guidelines, and Kenya Deposit Insurance Act; all as 
per their current year of enactment (Harwood, 2015). 
This is one of the industries in the Kenyan economy that has undergone a lot of change and 
growth. Banks have expanded through increase in the number of branches, with others such 
as Equity Bank Limited going regional, and venturing into more business such as the 
insurance industry. With technology, so has “mobile banking” been birthed. This has 
increased accessibility and made it easy for people to utilize banking services. 
2.3.1 Risks that face the banking industry 
Increased complexity in the dynamics of the financial market, business environment, and 
increased regulatory requirements for banks have made it harder to design the right course 
of action for continued success since risks have continued to emerge and evolve. Risk is 
the probability of deviation of results from the expected and it may be positively or 
negatively. In their book, Practical Risk Management, Erik Banks and Richard Dunn came 
up with the ten questions a board or the CEO ought to be able to answer of which this study 
finds quite relevant in the holistic risk management (Banks & Dunn, 2003). These 
questions cover the top 10 specific risks that the board should be accountable of in the 
journey towards creating transparency and enhancing simplicity at the same time thus 
bringing in the marriage between ERM and the board (Banks & Dunn, 2003). 
There are five main types of risks that face financial institutions and banks especially. 
Credit risk is the probability that a debtor or issuer of a financial instrument whether an 
individual, a company, or a country will default in repaying the principal and other 
investment-related cash flows per the terms specified in a credit agreement (Muteti, 2014). 
The development of the derivatives markets is bound to increase the scope of credit risk 
which affects a bank’s liquidity position in the event of its occurrence, 
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Interest rate risk is an expensive risk whereby it increases the vulnerability of a company 
to interest rate changes in terms of corporate debt and especially short-term debt (Muteti, 
2014).  Foreign exchange risk is variations caused by currency value changes to a bank that 
especially handles international business. Capital management risk is the risk associated 
with capital requirement which is a regulation provided by the Basel Accords the financ ia l 
institutions (Muteti, 2014). Lastly, liquidity risk which is the risk associated with a bank’s 
ability to efficiently accommodate the redemption of deposits and other liabilities, and to 
cover funding increases in the loan and investment portfolio (Muteti, 2014). 
2.4  Corporate Governance and ERM: The role of the board 
The focus on corporate governance has generally provided more than enough room for 
changes in corporate risk management whereby Companies with poor corporate 
governance practices have equally poor risk management skills, and the converse being 
also true (Lam, 2003). Regulatory and industrial initiatives such as the Turnbull Report, 
United Kingdom, and the Dey Report, Canada, have enhanced and increased the 
importance of corporate governance (Lam, 2003). COSO’s framework highlights four 
areas that the board’s contribution is core in implementation of ERM and they are: 
understanding and formulating the organisation’s risk philosophy and appetite, review of 
the portfolios of risks, appraisal of these risks, and oversight of key risk exposures. 
Corporate governance has progressively gained importance in Kenya due to several reasons 
among them being corporate failure and poor performance of public and private companies 
(Jerry Goodstein, 1994).  It is believed that the first corporate governance framework in 
Kenya was in 1999 by the Center for Corporate Governance Kenya which developed a 
framework that was voluntary for companies to adopt. This framework was then taken up 
by the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) in 2000 as draft corporate governance practices 
for listed companies in Kenya.  CMA later made it mandatory for listed companies to adopt 
those corporate governance practices that mainly tackled issues to do with the board such 
as board composition, role of audit committee (Jerry Goodstein, 1994). The banking 
industry in Kenya is highly regulated where the Central Bank of Kenya specifies the 
corporate governance practices to be adopted by all commercial banks operating in Kenya.  
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 Corporate governance is an important component of ERM as it provides for the top-down 
management of risk by ensuring that the board of directors and management have 
established the appropriate risk management processes and control measures across the 
organization ( McCrae & Balthazor, 2000). The purpose of ERM is to create, protect, and 
enhance shareholder value by managing the uncertainties associated with achieving the 
organization's objectives and so is the main responsibility of the board bringing in their 
utmost significance and relationship in this study (Financial Reporting Council, 2005). 
Most of the corporate governance principles such as those under the reports stated above 
clearly show that directors are directly responsible for initiating the foundations of a 
systematic approach to corporate risk management and risk-based approaches to interna l 
control (Lam, 2003; McCrae & Balthazor, 2000). Several aspects of ERM are, such as 
setting the risk appetite and establishing the organization’s culture, are closely allied to the 
work of the board. ERM frameworks recognize that the ultimate responsibility of risk 
management lies with the board of governors and top management especially, then trickles 
down to the entire organization ( Berger, Kick , & Schaeck, 2012). An organization with a 
good ERM framework has its BOD fully involved in their risk management process.  
2.4.1 Responsibilities of the board 
A proper risk process demands accountability hence assigning various respective 
responsibilities and enforcing them creates culpability. According to Banks & Dunn, 
(2003), the ultimate risk management responsibility for a given organization rests with the 
CEO and the board of directors. This scrapes off any opportunity for ignorance and ensures 
clarity. It is important for the top senior management levels to get the process right and 
keep it right (Lam, 2003). Failure to drive responsibility from the very top of an 
organization undermines the entire process as the rest of the team will not take it with the 
seriousness it deserves. Various reports, such as the Turnbull Report (2005), have laid 
down principles and policies that clearly outline the roles and responsibilities of every 
stakeholder in risk management with an insistent focus on the part board members ought 
to play in this (Financial Reporting Council, 2011). The reports outline the role played by 
the board in the implementation of a successful ERM framework (Banks & Dunn, 2003; 
Lam, 2003; McCrae & Balthazor, 2000; Financial Reporting Council, 2011). 
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2.5 Board composition and board diversity 
In order for a given board to carry out its roles and responsibilities efficiently and 
effectively, its composition should be carefully and strategically drawn. Various factors 
put forward by Ekadah & Mboya (2009), Pfeffer (1992), Jerry Goodstein (1994), and 
Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman( 2012) include the size, educational qualification, age, 
and gender among others depending on the organization size, industry, publicly trading, 
etc., as among those vital aspects that ought to be at the nerve center of a board 
construction. It is in this respect that diversity comes into play in the members of the board 
of directors and in the context of this study, board diversity in terms of size, gender and 
educational qualifications in relation to implementation of ERM.  
Board diversity can indirectly or directly benefit an organization by either significantly 
constraining a group's efforts to take decisive action (Jerry Goodstein, 1994), especially 
the board’s efforts to initiate strategic change in times of environmental turbulence, or by 
contributing to a more thorough decision-making process through provision of different 
experiences that enable a more extensive analysis of issues at hand ( Berger, Kick , & 
Schaeck, 2012). Heterogeneity and homogeneity in a board of directors each have a two-
fold effect on their roles and responsibilities. 
2.5.1 Board size 
Researchers have indicated to several ways in which board size enhances the organizationa l 
and governance functions of the board. Large boards have shown to have a positive 
influence by increasing the pool of expertise and resources for the organization (Pfeffer, 
1992) and also, they may enhance corporate governance by reducing CEO domination and 
making it more difficult for the CEO to build a broad consensus within the board to take 
actions that might not be in shareholder interests. On the other hand, increased size can 
significantly inhibit the board's ability to initiate strategic actions as well as encounter 
several barriers in reaching a consensus on important decisions such as less cohesion that 
comes with larger group decision making and decreased levels of motivation and 
satisfaction due to the lack of participation (Jerry Goodstein, 1994). 
Research has shown that larger boards are less likely to become involved in strategic 
decision making, are more difficult to coordinate due to the large number of potential 
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interactions among group members, and the nature of decisions made by board of directors 
are pertinent to be more unfavorably affected by large group dynamics  (Jerry Goodstein, 
1994). Deregulation and governance in the banking industry generally support the 
shrinkage of the board size and increase in outside representation on boards of directors 
resulting in less free-riding and promote more rapid decision making, factors that are of 
relevance in a deregulated environment (Lehn, 1997). 
2.5.2 Board composition and gender 
Gender is disputably the most longstanding and debated element of board composition with 
several studies under its belt which explain the competitive benefits that can be enjoyed by 
firms employing women on boards of directors (Mínguez-Vera, Campbell, & Antonio, 
2008) among other benefits.  
The disparity between women and men regarding prevalence in top management positions 
still prompts debate and study as to the extent of systematic bias against female managers 
and professionals as they seek positions of increasing authority and responsibility  (Philpot, 
2007). Whether women possess unique skills, expertise and experience that lead to their 
appointment to some committees and not others are an empirical question and evidence 
exists that women's characteristics and corporate behavior are evaluated differently from 
men's (Jago, 1982). 
Arguments for greater female boardroom representation can be split into two categories; 
ethical and economic. Ethical category argues that it is immoral for women to be excluded 
from corporate boards on the grounds of gender and that firms should increase gender 
diversity to achieve a more equitable outcome for society (Mínguez-Vera, Campbell, & 
Antonio, 2008). Greater female representation should be regarded not as a means to an end 
but as a desirable end in itself. Economic arguments are based on the proposition that firms 
which fail to select the most able candidates for the board of directors damage their 
financial performance (Mínguez-Vera, Campbell, & Antonio, 2008). 
There are also arguments that greater gender diversity may serve to reduce firm 
performance. A number of research suggests that homogeneous groups are more 
cooperative and experience fewer emotional conflicts. Greater gender diversity among 
board members generates more opinions and critical questions, and as a result more 
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conflicts, decision-making will be more time consuming and less effective ( (Lau, 1998; 
Mínguez-Vera, Campbell, & Antonio, 2008). 
A study carried out on UK corporate boards recorded results that the highest rates of female 
directors are associated with sectors associated with a close proximity to final consumers, 
i.e. retailing, banking, the media and utilities, whereas producer-oriented sectors such as 
resources, engineering and business services that are characterized by isolation from final 
consumers and male-dominated workforces, have significantly fewer female directors 
(Mínguez-Vera, Campbell, & Antonio, 2008). 
Findings show that women tend to serve on better performing boards with evidence shown 
in the Catalyst 2004 reports on 353 Fortune 500 companies in the United States over the 
period of 1996-2000. It was found that companies with the highest representation of 
women on their top management teams had a 35% better return on equity and 34% better 
total return to shareholders than those companies with the lowest female representation 
(Mínguez-Vera, Campbell, & Antonio, 2008)Attracting more women to serve on company 
boards requires that they have the educational opportunities and skills necessary to compete 
with male counterparts. 
2.5.3 Board diversity and education 
Many directors engage in occupations and activities that have little in common with their 
original professional or academic studies which could be explained by the fact that most 
corporate governance codes encourage the creation of board committees with specific 
strategic-led mandates, such as audit control and human resource, which implies that the 
board of directors should be drawn from a number of professional or educational 
backgrounds (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman, 2012). There is little evidence however 
of the relevance of occupational and the educational background of board members in the 
short-term performance of an organization whilst a negative correlation to long term 
performance manifests according to (Murray, 1989). 
With the increasing complexity in business environment, a wide array of knowledge and 
occupations is important as boards need to tackle with the multiple dimensions of a 
business’ decision, e.g. financial, human resource, legal, and ethical, environmenta l. 
Greater diversity in educational and functional background leads to better decision-mak ing 
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and provides the potential for faster and in-depth assessments of the implications of 
decisions at the board level and address any information asymmetry issues between the 
board and senior management.  
The underlying factor that led to the collapse of Rolls Royce in the 1970s  (Argenti, 1976) 
was the fact that the board was dominated by engineers with little concern for the financ ia l 
implications of the company's fated research and development activities and there was very 
little representation of accounting and finance backgrounds on the board. However, the oil 
industry is a special case where a homogeneous board dominated by engineering-educated 






3.1 Research design 
This is a correlational study as it is seeking to analyze the relationship between board 
composition and ERM.  The rapidly changing economic environment due to globaliza t ion 
of business and deregulation has made it significant for businesses to change their way of 
running business in order to fit in the new environment and enhance their sustainability. 
The search for the link between leadership in relation to the BOD and ERM in order to 
optimize their exploitation, is thus very relevant. This relationship is analyzed over an 
eight-year period from 2008 to 2015. This period serves as a rich source for this analysis 
since the effects of the changes and recommendations adopted, such as increased 
participation of the BOD in corporate governance, after the financial crisis are be 
immediately felt. 
Regression is applied in this study as it is a popular method with researchers in this field 
(e.g. Hoyt & Liebenberg (2008), Golshan & Rasid (2012), Wachudi & Mboya (2012), 
Scherbina, Afanasieva, & Lapina, (2013), (Keasey & Kevin, (2008)) . Diagnostic tests are 
carried out on the panel data in order to determine which panel model to use between 
pooling, fixed effects and random effects (Altuntas, Berry-Stölzle, & Hoyt, 2011). The 
specification test is also carried to establish whether to use the random effects model and 
the fixed effects model.  
3.2 Population and sampling 
The population used in this study was from the banking industry, Kenyan banks that are 
listed at the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). This is because publicly trading 
companies have their data and information available to the public as required by regulat ions 
such as the CBK prudential guidelines . This is done for the period between 2008 and 2015. 
There were a total of 10 banks but 4 banks were however eliminated from the population 
as they had incomplete data for the time period under consideration. 
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3.3  Data collection methods and variables 
The data used for this study were obtained from secondary sources. Secondary sources 
incorporated financial and board composition data from financial statements of these 
banks. This was because this data is available and easily accessible from the Capital 
Markets Authority (CMA) and the respective company websites. ERM is measured in 
terms of financial performance of the listed banks. The study uses return on equity (ROE) 
and operating income (OI) as its performance ratios. 
The size of board of directors of the various banks is manually taken down for from these 
companies’ financial reports. Diversity in term of education is characterized in terms of the 
different types of functional backgrounds presented in each company’s board. This is 
categorized in five bands where a company is assigned a band of 1 where only one 
educational background is present and a maximum of 5 where all backgrounds are present. 
These bands comprise of educational backgrounds in: business; engineering; finance and 
economics; law and political sciences; and accounting. 
The variables used in this study  
Variable Definition 
ROE Return on equity which is net income divided by net assets. 
OP Operating profits which is net income from continuing operations. 
Board number The total number of individuals in the BOD. 
Gender This is represented by the number of female directors in the BOD. 
Education The occupational expertise present in the BOD as shown by the number of 
educational backgrounds present. 
Table 2: Variables used in the study. A description of the variables used as indices for ERM 
in the study. 
3.4 Measuring variables 
3.4.1 Measuring board diversity 
Species richness which is the number of species in a community or region will be measured 
in terms of heterogeneity and evenness. In this context, species will refer to board of 
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directors. Diversity in terms of gender will analyzed using a diversity index as applied also 
by Hagendorff & Keasey (2012) who used the Herfindahl-type index and Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold (2000). The Shannon’s diversity index (1948) (Magurran, 2003) that 
will be used to calculate gender diversity is given by: 
Equation i 





𝑯 - Shannon’s diversity index, 
𝑵 - total number of individuals in the community, which is the board of directors in this 
case, and 
𝒑𝒊- proportion of 𝑁 made up in the i
th individual. 
For evenness, Shannon’s equitability (𝐸𝐻 ) is applied where a value between 0 and 1 is 
assumed with 1 being complete evenness. 
Equation ii 
𝐸𝐻 = 𝐻 𝐻𝑚𝑎𝑥⁄ = 𝐻 ln 𝑁⁄  
3.4.2 Measuring ERM 
ERM creates value in a firm as evidenced by the extensive research undertaken by Kraus 
& Lehner (2012) hence the study measures ERM in terms of financial performance of the 
listed banks, a method applied by Yegon, Mouni, & Wanjau (2014). With the major aim 
of this study in mind, numerous research done on board diversity are in relation to firms’ 
perfomance as seen in empirical study by Ekadah & Mboya (2009) and Kilic (2015). The 
study thus adopts Return on Equity (ROE) and Operating Income (OP) as measures of 
ERM and this is additionally supported by the the methods adopted by Hoyt & Liebenberg 





𝐸𝑅𝑀 = 𝑓(𝑅𝑂𝐸, 𝑂𝑃) 
3.4.3 Control variables 
Financial theory suggests that the dependent variable is influenced by more than one 
independent variable. The logarithm of operating income was used for reliability of the 
results. As for the number of women in gender diversity, the proportion of women to the 
total number of board members was used. Dummy variables were used in addition for the 
board size where small, medium and large boards were grouped in order to deduce results 
in even a more reliable way. 
3.5 Model specification 
A panel model is adopted for the analysis of the relationship between ERM and board 
composition of listed banks in Kenya. 
Equation iv 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝑦𝑥𝑡𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝐵𝑦𝑧𝑡𝑍𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Where; 
𝑖=1…𝑁; 𝑡=1…𝑇 
𝒀𝒊𝒕  – the value of the dependent variable, ERM; 
𝑿𝒊𝒕 -  the vector of time varying covariates; 
𝑩𝒚𝒙𝒕 - the row vector of coefficients;  
𝒁𝒊 – the vector of time invariant covariates;  
𝑩𝒚𝒛𝒕 - the row vector of coefficients;  
𝝀𝒕 -  coefficient of the latent time-invariant variable; 
𝜼𝒊 – a scalar of other time-invariant variables, and 





4. DATA ANALYSIS 
4.1  Introduction 
The analysis was done on the panel data of 10 Kenyan banks that are listed in the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange (NSE) on 48 observations divided in 6 groups. This number however 
reduced to 6 due to unavailability and unreliability of data from some of the banks. The 
independent variable in the model is board of directors’ composition in terms of board size, 
educational qualifications going under the term education bands, and the number of women 
in each board to meet the gender aspect. The dependent variable is ERM which in this 
study was measured in terms of performance ratios in return on equity (ROE) and operating 
profit (OP). The control variables are the logarithm of OP; proportion of women; and large, 
medium and small to categorize the board size. This is then regressed to analyze the results.  
4.2  Shannon’s diversity test 
The Shannon’s diversity test was carried out on gender and education aspects of boards. 
The equitability aspect of the index assumes a value between 0 and 1. The lower the value 
the more the diversity and the converse is also true. Diversity based on gender scored an 
average of 0.8 and education 0.6. these are both considerably high values hence low level 
of diversity in accordance to Shannon’s diversity index. When rounded off to the number, 
a diversity of 1 is achieved all through. 
Company Education Diversity Gender Diversity 
Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Limited 0.595 0.880 
Housing Finance 0.406 0.750 
Standard Chartered Bank 0.604 0.644 
Equity Group Holdings 0.570 0.708 
Cooperative Bank 0.661 0.761 
NIC Bank Limited 0.564 0.880 
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Table 3: This table shows the Shannon's diversity index in terms of gender, number of 
women in the BOD, and education, in terms of number of education backgrounds found in 
the board. 
4.3  Diagnostic tests 
One important decision when using a panel data approach regards which type of panel 
model to use: pooling, fixed effects and random effects. The Random Effects estimator is 
consistent and asymptotically normally distributed under fulfilled assumptions of model 
linearity, independence, strict exogeneity, no autocorrelation, unrelated effects and 
constant variance of the individual specific effect.  
The Fixed effects estimator is unbiased under assumptions of model linear ity, 
independence, strict exogeneity and no perfect collinearity in small samples. Assuming no 
serial correlation and normally distributed idiosyncratic errors, it is normally distributed in 
small samples. The pooled OLS estimators are unbiased under fulfilled assumptions of 
model linearity, independence, strict exogeneity and unrelated effects in small samples. 
Additionally, assuming and normally distributed idiosyncratic and individual specific 
errors, it is normally distributed in small samples.  
We use the F-Test to investigate the presence of pooling versus fixed effects, the Breusch-
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) Test to investigate the presence of pooling versus random 
effects and Hausman Test to investigate the presence of random effects versus fixed effects.  
4.3.1 F-Test: pooled vs fixed effects 
Under a pooled regression, it is held that the fixed effects are zero, this is the null 
hypothesis. This hypothesis is tested by an F test, which is based on loss of goodness-of-
fit. If the null hypothesis of the F-test is rejected, a fixed effect model is favored over OLS. 
This was ran on the two models and they both had p-values of 0 hence fixed effects model 
were favored. 
4.3.2 Pooled vs Random Effects: The Breusch-Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test  
We use the LM test to decide between a random effects regression and a simple OLS 
regression. The null hypothesis in the LM test is that variances across entities is zero, i.e. 
no panel effect. If the null hypothesis of the LM test is rejected, a random effect model is 
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better than the pooled OLS. When run on the two models, ROE had a z-value of 0.233 and 
0.000 for OP. ROE thus was in favor of pooled effects whereas OP was in favor of random 
effects. Fixed effects are adopted when against pooled effects hence ROE took up the fixed 
effects model. As for OP, the Hausman test was carried out to decide between fixed and 
random effects. 
4.3.3 Hausman test 
We conduct the Hausman test when both hypotheses of the F-test and LM test are all 
rejected. We run both the Fixed Effects Model and the Random Effects Model and 
implement the Hausman test to choose which model gives consistent estimates. Hausman 
tests the null hypothesis that the extra orthogonality conditions imposed by the random 
effects estimator are valid, therefore that the Random Effects model provides consistent 
estimates. The fixed effects estimator, which does not impose those conditions, is 
consistent regardless of the independence of the individual effects. The fixed effects 
estimates are inefficient if that assumption of independence is warranted. The random 
effects estimator is efficient under the assumption of independence, but inconsis tent 
otherwise. A z-value of 0.0545 was recorded for OP and the difference in coefficients were 
not systematic hence random effects model adopted. 
4.4 Relationship between ERM and board composition 
Board size, gender representation, and educational qualification are seen to influence the 
board composition since their p-values are less than 5%. The chi squared test that F-test 
values are consecutively zero showing that the models are significant. R2 of 0.132 indicates 
that ROE accounts for 13% of the total variance in the relationship between ERM and BOD 
composition. A coefficient of 0.054 means that for every unit increase in ROE, there is a 
0.054 unit increase in the size of the board is predicted, holding all other variables constant.  
The values for medium board are omitted because of collinearity. There is little effect of 
board composition on ROE but size of the board has the highest effect.  
Variable Coefficient P>|t| 
Small board 0.004 0.891 
Medium board - - 
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Large board 0.054 0.075 
Proportion of women -0.174 0.342 
Education bands -0.024 0.304 
   
Probability > F 0.0025 
Average R-squared 0.132 
Table 4:Fixed effects model results for the regression of board composition and the ERM 
variable, ROE. The coefficient indicates the volatility between the two whereas t-values 
indicates the level of significance of the variables. 
OP is observed to influence the board composition as the p-values are less than 5%. The 
chi square test is simultaneously zero showing that the model is significant. R-Squared is 
the proportion of variance in the dependent variable which can be explained by the 
variables. An R2 of 0.440means that this model accounts for 44% of the total variance in 
BOD composition on ERM implementation. A coefficient of 3.809 means that proportion 
of women has 3.809 effect to ERM in terms of OP. In addition, at the p-value of this 
coefficient is significant hence it can be concluded that women representation has the 
highest effect as compared to the other variables. 
Variable Coefficient P>|z| 
Small board -0.374 0.088 
Medium board - - 
Large board 0.194 0.390 
Proportion of women 3.809 0.005 
Education bands -0.099 0.565 
   
Probability > chî 2 0.000  
Average R-squared 0.440  
Table 5: Random effects model results for the regression of OP and BOD composition. The 





5. Conclusion and Recommendations  
The banking industry is a pillar of the financial industry and the economy at large. It is an 
industry associated with high risk and for this, decisions that are made should take into 
consideration various aspects that they are intertwined with ( Berger, Kick , & Schaeck, 
2012). It is for this that enterprise risk management (ERM) and its implementation ought 
to be taken with utmost seriousness. This is especially important for the Kenyan economy 
which is a developing one as have developed economies have with others such as the 
United States making it a mandatory requirement. 
From the data analysis done above, the study found that boards in the Kenyan listed banks 
are not diversified in terms of gender despite measures such as the gender quota share being 
enforced. Women representation in boards is very minimal as the majority of boards having 
two female directors and a maximum of 4. Diversification in terms of education is also low 
though it is better with most boards having a minimum of 3 out 5 educational backgrounds 
present.  
The board size is the component that made the highest contribution towards ERM 
implementation in the banks. This may be because there’s a legal requirement of the 
minimum number that should make up a board. Educational qualification made an average 
but still vital contribution to the study’s quest. This is because most board members are 
appointed based on their experience and economic value and not necessarily their 
educational qualifications, a factor which is considered in lower management. Women 
proportion was observed to no affect operating profits but not return on equity which may 
be explained by the small sample of the study. 
This research recommends that further studies be done on this topic since this is an issue 
that will be of more than considerable relevance if it has not already especially in Kenya. 
More studies also need to be done on the level of ERM implementation in the banking 
industry and in addition offer customized guidelines on how to go about this in connection 
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Appendix 1: Fixed effects model results for the regression of board composition and the 
ERM variable, ROE. The coefficient indicates the volatility between the two whereas t-
values indicates the level of significance of the variables. 
Variable Coefficient P>|t| 
Education bands -0.037 0.083 
Board number 0.013 0.022 
Proportion of women -0.225 0.209 
   
Probability > F 0.0014 
Average R-squared 0.132 
Table 6: ROE fixed effects model results. 
Appendix 2: Random effects model results for the regression of OP and BOD composition. 
The coefficient indicates the volatility between the two and the t-value indicates the level 
of significance. 
Variable Coefficient P>|z| 
Education bands 0.002 0.990 
Board number 0.086 0.059 
Proportion of women 3.526 0.014 
   
Probability > chî 2 0.000  
Average R-squared 0.434  
Table 7: Hausman random effects model results on OP. 
